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Questions Presented for Review 
The petition for writ of certiorari does not present 
questions for review but rather presents an argumentative 
statement. The questions presented for review, expressed in 
the terms and circumstances of the case as required by Rule 
46(a)(4), would more adequately be stated as follows: 
Did the Court of Appeals improperly affirm the District 
Courtfs exercise of discretion in denying the appellants 
motion for continuance and its motion to compel the taking of 
a further deposition of a witness who had been deposed some 
months prior? 
Does the petition for certiorari raise any question as 
to the propriety of the affirmance of the summary judgment 
that would warrant review by this Court? 
Reference to Reports of Opinions 
Issued by the Court of Appeals 
The Court of Appeals opinion is officially reported at 
740 P. 2d 275. A copy of that report is contained in the 
appendix to this brief. The appendix also contains a copy of 
the summary judgment entered by the District Court. 
Jurisdiction 
The order of this Court granting an extension of time 
within which the petitioner could file its petition for writ 
of certiorari was improvidently granted, and this Court lacks 
jurisdiction to consider the petition for writ of certiorari 
for the reasons set forth in respondents' motion to vacate 
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the order granting the extension of time and to dismiss the 
petition for writ of certiorari. 
Controlling Provisions of Law 
Disposition of the case involves application of Rule 56, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and particularly subparagraphs 
(b), (c), (e) and (f) of Rule 56. Rule 56 is set forth 
verbatim in the appendix. 
Statement of the Case 
The Nature of the Case, 
The Course of Proceedings, and 
Disposition in the Lower Courts 
The petitioner's statement of the case is incomplete. 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals (740 P.2d 275) gives an 
adequate statement of the case. The petitioner's complaint 
in the District Court alleged that the respondents had 
breached a written instrument entitled "Construction and 
Lease Agreement" and an alleged oral modification of that 
agreement. The District Court found as a matter of law, 
based primarily on admissions made by the petitioner itself, 
that none of the several conditions precedent stated in the 
subject contract had been performed by the petitioner. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed and also affirmed denial of 
petitioner's belated motion to compel the further deposition 
of Mr. Sidney M. Horman. 
Petitioner does not rest its petition for writ of 
certiorari on any asserted substantive error. Rather, 
petitioner asserts purely procedural error in that it claims 
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that the District Court should have granted its motion to 
compel the additional deposition of Mr. Horman. 
Petitioner does attempt to raise a second point—that 
"summary judgment may only be granted when there is no issue 
of fact" (Petitionf p. 8) and that "A court [must] . . • take 
a view most favorable to the party resisting a Motion for 
Summary Judgment" (Petition, p. 3). Petitioner does not, 
however, even attempt to show how the Court of Appeals or the 
District Court in any way failed to follow these rules. The 
mere contention that the rule was violated, without any 
attempt to show in what way it was violated, is not adequate 
ground for certiorari. 
Thus, no substantive issue is raised, and we do not 
reach on this petition the undisputed facts which clearly 
establish that not even one of the several different 
conditions precedent had been accomplished by the 
petitioner. This is discussed more fully below, but because 
the petition shows no evidence in the record on this point, 
the statement of facts will not be extended on this point. 
On this petition we therefore look solely to petitioner's 
contention that it was somehow improperly denied the 
opportunity for further deposing Mr. Horman. 
Statement of Facts Relevant 
To Issues Presented for Review 
On September 9, 1983, plaintiff and petitioner Downtown 
Athletic Club, Inc., filed the complaint against respondents 
S. M. Horman, S. M. Horman & Sons, and S. M. Horman & Sons 
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Company seeking both specific performance and money damages 
for an alleged breach of two purported agreements pertaining 
to property located in the center of Block 57 in downtown 
Salt Lake City. (R. 2-55.) Even though the complaint was 
filed in September of 1983f inexplicably service was not made 
until December 6, 1983. (R. 58, 59, and 60.) Respondents 
answered and counterclaimed against petitioner and its 
principal officer David G. Yurth for declaratory relief, 
tortious waste, unlawful detainer, and slander of title. (R. 
75-118.) 
Three days after service of the summons and complaint, 
petitioner noticed the deposition of Mr. Horman. (R. 71.) 
Six days after service of the summons, petitioner served 
lengthy "Requests for Production of Documents." (R. 61.) 
Respondents responded to the requests, filed their own 
"Requests for Production of Documents" on January 13, 1984, 
and noticed the taking of the deposition of petitioner 
through David G. Yurth, its president, on December 15, 
1983. (R. 73, 123-134, 135-147.) Respondents produced all 
of the requested documents, and petitioner produced what it 
claimed to be all of its corporate records, consisting of 
thousands of documents. The deposition of David G. Yurth was 
taken by respondents on April 2, 1984 (R. 607), and 
petitioner took Mr. Horman's deposition on April 26, 1984. 
(R. 608.) 
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No further discovery was undertaken by petitioner. On 
July 19, 1984, respondents filed their motion for summary 
judgment together with supporting affidavits and a memorandum 
of points and authorities. (R. 369 and 322-368.) At the 
same time, notice of hearing was served scheduling oral 
argument on the motion for August 28, 1984, thus providing 
petitioner nearly six weeks in which to respond. (R. 372.) 
On August 22, 1984, rather than responding to the motion, and 
only five days before the scheduled hearing, petitioner's 
counsel moved to withdraw from the case and for a sixty-day 
extension to respond to respondents1 motion. (R. 376, 
378.) The District Court granted both motions on August 28, 
1984, the date scheduled for the original hearing. (R. 
380.) Sixty days lapsed, however, without any appearance of 
counsel and without any response to the motion for summary 
judgment. 
On October 26, 1984, respondents served notice pursuant 
to U.C.A. § 78-51-36 requiring petitioner to appoint 
counsel. (R. 382.) On November 2, 1984, they renoticed 
their motion for summary judgment for hearing on November 16, 
1984. (R. 384.) 
Three days prior to the November 16th hearing, Lorin N. 
Pace and William B. Parsons III of the firm of Pace, Klimt, 
Wunderli & Parsons formally appeared as counsel for 
petitioner and filed a motion for continuance and nine 
notices of depositions. (R. 552, 565, 554-561, 568-569, and 
579-586.) 
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Shortly before the scheduled hearing on November 16, 
petitioner filed what it denominated as an "Extraordinary 
Request for Review" by which it sought a hearing on its 
motion for continuance even though that motion was not timely 
noticed. (R. 387.) At the hearing on the motion for summary 
judgment, petitioner requested to be heard on its request for 
extraordinary review and motion for continuance. Even though 
neither of these motions had been properly noticed, 
respondents did not object to petitioner being heard, and 
petitioner's extraordinary request for review was granted but 
its motion for continuance was denied. Oral argument was 
presented on the motion for summary judgment, and the Court 
took the motion under advisement, giving petitioner twenty 
days in which to file a written response. (R. 386, 591.) 
On the twentieth day—December 7, 1984—rather than 
filing the required response to the motion for summary 
judgment, petitioner filed a motion seeking to compel the 
taking of the deposition of only one of the nine depositions 
noticed just prior to the hearing. (R. 393.) By this motion 
petitioner sought only to take further deposition of Mr. 
Horman, who had previously been deposed in the case. 
After having obtained still further extension of time, 
on December 10, 1984, petitioner finally filed its memorandum 
in opposition to the motion for summary judgment accompanied 
by eight affidavits, several of which were unsworn and 
unsigned. (R. 406-449.) Respondents timely submitted their 
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reply memorandum (R. 502) and a motion to strike the unsworn, 
unsigned, and improper affidavits of David Yurthf Grant 
Squires, and Maurice Green. (R. 542.) Petitioner made no 
response to the motion to strike, and it did not correct any 
of its improper affidavits. 
Following the Court's Memorandum Decision of January 23, 
1985 (R. 587), its Order and Summary Judgment was entered on 
February 6, 1984. (R. 590.) The Court denied petitioner's 
motion to further depose Mr. Horman (R. 595); granted 
respondents1 motion to strike the two unsigned and unsworn 
affidavits (the Green and Squires affidavits), the affidavit 
of Mr. Yurth purporting to verify the unsigned affidavits, 
and those portions of the second Yurth affidavit that did not 
comply with Rule 56(e) (R. 596); and granted summary judgment 
in favor of the respondents. (R. 597.) The District Court 
held: 
Rule 56 requires that when a motion for summary 
judgment is made and supported, as provided in the 
rule, which is the case here, the response must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a 
"genuine" issue for trial. Rule 56 requires 
judgment if there is no "genuine" issue as to 
"material" facts. The motion for summary judment 
has been amply supported, as provided in the rule, 
and shows that there can be no genuine issue that 
plaintiff has failed to comply with several 
conditions precedent in the agreements upon which 
plaintiff's complaint is based, and that the 
alleged oral agreement or modification fails to 
meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. 
The plaintiff's response has not shown that there 
is a genuine issue as to any material fact, and the 
motion for summary judgment must therefore be 
granted. There is no just reason for delay in 
entry of this judgment, and summary judgment in 
favor of defendants on plaintiff's complaint should 
be entered at this time. (R. 596-597.) 
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In denying the motion to take further deposition of Mr, 
Horman, the Court noted: 
[T]he deposition of Mr. Horman was taken in this 
case by previous counsel for plaintiff on April 26, 
1984. Plaintiff, during the entire time that the 
motion for summary judgment was pending, made no 
further effort to take further deposition of Mr, 
Horman or to undertake any further discovery until 
the filing of various notices of taking depositions 
three days before the hearing on the motion for 
summary judgment on November 16, 1984. The 
affidavit filed by plaintiff's counsel does not 
state any specific area of inquiry that is 
essential to a ruling on the motion for summary 
judgment or that is otherwise relevant to this 
action and which was not inquired into in the prior 
deposition. There is, therefore, no adequate 
showing that the court's prior order denying 
plaintiff's motion for continuance should be 
altered, and there is no adequate showing that 
there is any information material to a disposition 
of the motion for summary judgment that has not 
previously been covered in the extensive deposition 
heretofore taken of Mr. Horman. The Court, having 
considered said motion and affidavits, hereby 
denies the motion to compel further deposition of 
Mr. Horman upon the ground that the motion is 
contrary to the previous order of the court denying 
continuance of the hearing on the motion for 
summary judgment and upon the ground that nothing 
in the motion or affidavit in support thereof shows 
any adequate grounds or basis for the granting of 
said motion. (R. 595.) 
ARGUMENT 
I. Petitioner Conducted Extensive Discovery 
and Showed No Adequate Reason for the 
Additional Deposition that it Sought 
The petition artfully attempts to create the impression 
that the petitioner had not conducted any discovery and was 
refused the opportunity for discovery. As shown above at 
page 4, that is not correct. Here are some other examples of 
inaccuracies: The statement that "[d]efendant would not make 
-8-
himself available for deposition . . . " (Petition, p. 5) is 
clearly wrong. As shown at page 11, below, Mr. Horman had 
been thoroughly deposed. The statement that "many of the 
[six] persons [whose affidavits were filed by respondents] 
were complete strangers to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff desired 
and gave notice of taking their depositions" (Petition, p. 5) 
is also inaccurate. Of the nine depositions noticed by 
petitioner three days before the continued hearing, all were 
persons known by petitioner. Most tellingly, the petitioner 
did not notice the depositions of the only two whom 
petitioner did not know—Mr. George Throckmorton, a 
handwriting expert whose uncontroverted affidavit establishes 
that an item of evidence submitted by petitioner was a 
forgery, and Mr. Sherman Gillman, an officer of the insurance 
company from which petitioner claimed to have obtained a loan 
commitment, whose uncontroverted affidavit established the 
total falsity of the unsigned affidavit oi! one Maurice Green, 
purported by petitioner to be a loan officer of that 
company. 
As outlined above, extensive discovery was conducted by 
both parties which ended with petitioner's taking of Mr. 
Horman1s deposition on April 26, 1984. After the lapse of 
three months, respondents moved for summary judgment on July 
19, 1984, and scheduled oral argument for August 28, 1984, 
giving the petitioner six weeks in which to respond. A 
sixty-day extension of time from August 28, 1984, was granted 
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by the District Court upon motion by petitioner. (R. 380.) 
On November 2, 1984, more than four months after filing of 
the motion for summary judgment, and with absolutely no 
action on the part of petitioner to respond to the motion or 
otherwise plead, respondents again noticed their motion for 
oral argument for November 16, 1984. At the last minute, 
counsel for petitioner moved for a continuance at the time of 
the hearing, stating that he could not respond to the motion 
and needed additional time to complete the nine depositions 
noticed three days before the oral argument. 
At the November 16, 1984, hearing, the District Court 
considered petitionees extraordinary request for review and 
motion for continuance. (R. 386, 391.) The request for 
review was granted, but the Court declined to continue the 
hearing on the motion for summary judgment, preferring to 
hear counsel's position with respect to that motion. (R. 
386, 391.) The Court did, however, give petitioner an 
additional twenty days to submit a written response. (R. 
386, 391.) Petitioner sought and was granted still another 
extension to file its memorandum. It did file within the 
twenty days, however, a motion to compel the taking of one of 
the nine depositions. In seeking by motion to compel only 
one of the nine depositions, petitioner thereby necessarily 
conceded the lack of merit in its prior motion to continue 
the hearing in order to take nine depositions and 
acknowledged the appropriateness of the District Court's 
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ruling. The sole deposition sought was the further 
deposition of Mr. Horman, who had previously been deposed 
more than seven months prior to the hearing on the motion for 
summary judgment. 
Petitioner did not schedule or file any notice of 
hearing on its motion to compel. Petitioner's counsel 
offered his affidavit to the effect that the April 26, 1984, 
deposition of Mr. Horman was not completed and needed to be 
continued. (R. 395.) Counsel's affidavit, stated simply, 
did not articulate or even suggest any area of inquiry that 
was not covered in the prior deposition or that was in need 
of further exploration. There was no indication that even 
the unspecified areas of inquiry were relevant to the issues 
presented on the motion for summary judgmeht. 
The deposition seven months earlier of the 80-year old 
Mr. Horman had been exhaustive in both its breadth and depth 
of inquiry and consumed an entire day and 243 pages of 
deposition transcript. As pointed out by the affidavit of 
respondents' counsel (R. 402), it was inconceivable that any 
further area of relevant inquiry could possibly exist. 
Furthermore, at the end of the deposition session on April 
26, 1984, it was clear that the deposition was not continued 
indefinitely. At the time the deposition was noticed, 
petitioner's counsel had instructed and required that Mr. 
Horman and his lawyer be available for two full days. 
Schedules were rearranged to meet that demand. Petitioner's 
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counself however, obviously having exhausted every 
conceivable avenue of inquiryf and having cross-examined the 
witness with reference to eighteen document exhibits, 
abruptly terminated the deposition at 4:30 p.m. on the first 
day and advised that he did not wish to proceed further at 
that time. It was made clear that Mr. Horman was prepared to 
proceed further that day and the next day as scheduled by 
petitioner's counsel, but petitioner chose not to proceed. 
(R. 402.) 
Faced with the necessity of producing some reasonable 
objection to the District Court's ruling, in light of the 
District Court's lenient permission in granting extensions of 
time to respond in writing to respondents' motion for summary 
judgmentf counsel for petitioner endeavored to justify its 
demand for the further deposition of Mr. Horman. Statements 
of Mr. Horman's counsel reciting the witness's previous 
availability as demanded by petitioner's counsel and the 
absence of any need for further deposition were not 
challenged by petitioner. If petitioner seriously believed 
that the prior deposition was continued and that further 
inquiry was necessary, it should have acted promptly to 
complete its inquiry rather than wait more than seven months 
to raise the issue. A deposition cannot be continued 
indefinitely. 
In challenging this ruling, petitioner cites here, as it 
did in the Court of Appeals, Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311, 
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313 (Utah 1984), and Auerbach's, Inc. v. Kimball, 572 P.2d 
376 (Utah 1977), which it claims stand for the proposition 
that it is an abuse of discretion to enter summary judgment 
where discovery is not completed. 
In order to properly consider petitioner's challenge of 
the rulings below, it is essential to establish what 
petitioner is contending and what is not at issue. First, 
petitioner has not contended that it was denied an 
opportunity under Rule 56(f) to obtain affidavits or other 
discovery to oppose the motion for summary judgment, as was 
the case in Cox v. Winters, supra. Petitioner did not 
present to the Court, as required by Rule 56(f), any 
acceptable "reason" why it either needed the specific nine 
depositions it noticed at the last minute, and thereafter 
abandoned when it sought by motion to compel only the 
deposition of Mr. Horman, or why it could not present, 
without those depositions, facts essential to justify its 
opposition to respondents' motion. It did not present an 
affidavit of any handwriting expert to counter the affidavit 
of Mr. Throckmorton establishing that one of petitioner's 
exhibits was a forgery, nor did petitioner even seek to take 
the deposition of Mr. Throckmorton. Petitioner did not seek 
to take the deposition of the affiant from the insurance 
company, whose affidavit showed the total falsity of one of 
the unsigned affidavits presented by petitioner. The notices 
of deposition were obviously not related to respondents' 
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motion for summary judgment. Petitioner did not pursue them 
and thereby waived any claimed right to compel their 
taking. The unsigned affidavits submitted by petitioner with 
Mr. Yurth's assurances that the affiants would sign the 
affidavits if they could have been found are not proper under 
Rule 56(e) and do not invoke Rule 56(f) to require the 
suspension of consideration of the motion for summary 
judgment until the signatures could be obtained. No 
acceptable "reason" was presented why the signatures were not 
obtained. In addition, Mr. Yurth's assurances that the 
affiants would sign the prepared affidavits is disingenuous, 
because the affiants in reality either could not or would not 
sign them. For example, Mr. Maurice Green could not have 
signed the affidavit prepared for him because it is 
absolutely clear from the uncontroverted affidavit of Mr. 
Sherman Gillman of Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance 
Company (R. 319) that Mr. Green was never employed by 
Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Company as a loan 
officer and never obtained a loan commitment from 
Transamerica as represented in his unsigned affidavit. Mr. 
Grant Squires, a local resident, who has always been 
available for signing the affidavit prepared by petitioner, 
informed respondents1 counsel that he had refused to sign 
that proffered affidavit. Thus, there is no appropriate 
claim under Rule 56(f) for affidavits or discovery to oppose 
respondents' motion since petitioner has never presented an 
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acceptable reason why the motion should not have been heard 
until certain affidavits or discovery are obtained. 
Since Rule 56(f) is not at issue, the only issue that 
petitioner raises is that it must be permitted general 
discovery on issues not material to the summary judgment 
matter. The cases cited by petitioner in support of this 
proposition. Cox and Auerbach's, hold almost completely the 
opposite. 
In Cox the court quoted Strand v. Associated Students of 
University of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 194 (Utah 1977), citing 6, 
Part 2, Moore's Federal Practice (2d Ed.) § 56.24, pp. 56-
1424 to 15-1426 [sic], and stated: 
Where, howeverf the party opposing summary judgment 
timely presents his affidavit under Rule 56(f) 
stating reasons why he is presently unable to 
proffer evidentiary affidavits he directly and 
forthrightly invokes the trial court's 
discretion. Unless dilatory or lacking in merit, 
the motion should be liberally treated. Exercising 
a sound discretion the trial court then determines 
whether the stated reasons are adequate. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Although petitioner's motion was not denominated as a Rule 
56(f) motion, it was so considered by the Court of Appeals, 
but the Court rightly held that the motion gave no adequate 
reason for the additional discovery, was not timely, and was 
nothing more than a "fishing expedition." (740 P.2d at 278, 
279.) Neither the motion or the supporting affidavit gave 
any reason why the proposed depositions had any relevance to 
the motion for summary judgment. It can hardly be contested 
that petitioner's notices and motion to compel were 
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dilatory. They were both filed more than four months after 
the motion for summary judgment was filed and seven months 
after the last discovery was taken. Finallyf Cox admonishes 
the exercise of sound discretion in determining if the 
"reasons stated for additional discovery are adequate." 
Here, where no reasons whatever were offered, the Court of 
Appeals properly affirmed the District Court. 
Cox and Auerbach1s recognize three other instances where 
the entry of summary judgment in the face of requests for 
discovery would be an abuse of discretion: first, where 
there has "not been sufficient time since the inception of 
the lawsuit for plaintiff to utilize discovery procedures, 
and thereby have an opportunity to cross examine the moving 
party"; second, where "discovery proceedings were timely 
initiated, but never afforded an appropriate response"; and 
third, where discovery sought is relevant to the issues 
presented in the motion for summary judgment and not a 
"'fishing expedition' for purely speculative evidence after 
substantial discovery has been conducted without producing 
any significant evidence." (I_d. at 313-314.) See also, 
First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 
U.S. 253 (1968), cited in Cox v. Winters, supra, at n. 9. 
These instances have no application here other than to 
underscore that the District Court properly exercised its 
discretion. Petitioner had ample time to complete discovery 
in the eleven months after suit was filed and prior to 
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respondents1 filing of its motion. Again, petitioner did 
nothing in the three months prior to filing of the motion and 
then did nothing the following four months. It is noteworthy 
that respondents did not follow the practice of some 
litigants, who give only the shortest possible notice for 
hearing on a motion for summary judgment, but gave nearly six 
weeks1 notice; that the hearing was continued at petitioner's 
request an additional sixty days; and that even the second 
notice of hearing gave petitioner more than two weeks in 
which to respond. The last minute filing of notices of 
deposition just before the hearing on the motion is clearly 
dilatory. There was no outstanding, unresponded to discovery 
in existence prior to the filing of the motion for summary 
judgment as was found in both Cox and Auerbach's. In those 
cases, the outstanding discovery went to various issues under 
consideration in the motion, and thus it was not proper for 
the court to enter summary judgment until the discovery was 
properly responded to. Here, however, respondents had openly 
and fairly responded to all discovery propounded, and 
petitioner had not only the opportunity but did in fact 
"cross examine the moving party." Petitioner's last minute 
attempt to give the appearance that discovery was incomplete 
was shown for what it was—an attempt to delay the 
proceeding. Petitioner's abandonment of its untimely filed 
discovery, with its motion to compel being directed only to 
Mr. Horman's further deposition, demonstrates that the entire 
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proposal was nothing more than a "fishing expedition" 
frequently utilized to avoid the salutary impact of summary 
judgment—a practice the courts will not sanction. Cox v. 
Winters, 678 P.2d 311f 314 (Utah 1984), citing First National 
Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 298 
(1968). 
The District Court gave careful consideration to 
petitioner's efforts to delay the hearing. Since petitioner 
offered no reasons for the untimely discovery demands or its 
relevance to issues raised in the motion for summary 
judgment, petitioner's motions were properly denied. The 
Court did, however, withhold decision and gave petitioner 
liberal opportunity to make written response. That decision 
is above reproach. 
II. The Decision of the Court of Appeals 
Properly Affirmed the Summary Judgment 
Petitioner's second argument is a non-argument. It 
merely states rules of law with which there can be no 
argument, but it does not show that the Court of Appeals in 
any way violated those rules. Neither the Court of Appeals 
nor the District Court made any findings of fact, but each 
concluded on the basis of undisputed fact that summary 
judgment was appropriate. Contrary to petitioner's 
assertion, the Court of Appeals specifically recognized and 
followed the rule requiring it to review facts and inferences 
in a light most favorable to the party against whom the 
judgment was granted. 740 P.2d at 278. While petitioner 
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contends that the "facts have been controverted," there is no 
reference in the petition to even one of the facts found to 
be undisputed that the petitioner has "controverted." Rule 
56 requires that there be a "genuine" issue as to a 
"material" fact. Unsigned, unsworn affidavits do not create 
genuine issues. Forged instruments do not create genuine 
issues. A contention that financing had been obtained, which 
contention is based on an unsigned affidavit purportedly 
proffered by a supposed lending officer of an insurance 
company, raises no issue of fact whatever; but even 
proffering such an affidavit raises serious questions when 
the proper affidavit of an officer of that insurance company 
establishes that the man was not so employed and that no such 
loan commitment was ever made. There is nothing in the 
petition, just as there was nothing in either Court below, to 
controvert the undisputed fact that required engineering 
studies were never completed and never submitted to the 
City. So it is also with respect to each one of the other 
conditions precedent. 
The petition cites no fact whatever that was properly 
controverted or genuinely placed in issue. The mere 
statement in the petition for writ of certiorari that there 
are issues does not create issues. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The petition for writ of certiorari does not present any 
special and important reason (as required by Rule 43) why 
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this Court should exercise its discretion to review the well-
considered decision of the Court of Appeals. Sound 
discretion was exercised by the District Court in denying the 
untimely request to further depose a party previously 
deposed. No reason whatever was given for the reopening of 
the deposition, and there was no showing in either of the 
Courts below, and there is none here, that the proposed 
additional discovery was directed to any issue material to 
the motion for summary judgment. The petition recites that 
there were questions of fact, but there is not here, just as 
there was not in the Court of Appeals, any citation to any 
fact established, or that could be established, by affidavit 
or by deposition or document, which would have established a 
genuine issue as to any material fact. The judgment below 
was based on unrebutted affidavits, petitioner's own 
documents, and admissions in the deposition of petitioner's 
own officer. The decision of the Court of Appeals is sound, 
and the petition here presents no ground for review. 
Respectfully submitted. 
DATED this 12th day of November, 1987. 
CHAPMAN AND JGUTIJER 
L. R^jSaxStfier, Jr. 
Thomas R. Vuksinick 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
Downtown Athletic Club, 
a Utah Corporation/ 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
S. M. Horman, an individual 
a/k/a Sid Horman; S. M. 
Horman & Sons, a partnership; 
and S. M. Horman & Sons Company, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
S. M. Horman & Sons Company, 
Counter-Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Downtown Athletic Club, a Utah 
corporation, and David G. Yurth, 
an individual, 
Counter-Defendants and 
Appellant. 
Before Judges Billings, Garff, and Jackson. 
Billings, Judge: 
Appellant, Downtown Athletic Club ("DAC") appeals from the 
district court*s judgment denying its motion to continue and 
its motion to compel further discovery, and granting 
respondents1 (jointly referred to as ••Horman*1) motion for 
summary judgment. DAC contends that the trial court erred in 
ruling as a matter of law that the conditions precedent to the 
parties9 agreement were not satisfied thus discharging Hormanfs 
obligation to perform. We affirm. 
DAC executed a written agreement with S. M. Horman on May 
8, 1981 entitled ••Construction & Lease Agreement for the 
Downtown Athletic Club- (-Construction & Lease Agreement-). 
This agreement provided that Horman would construct athletic 
OPINION 
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clubs and then sublease the clubs to DAC. The Construction -& 
Lease Agreement delineated several conditions precedent to 
Horman*s obligation to perform: 
1. Horman would construct improvements to the Harver 
Warehouse Building provided that the Harver Warehouse 
Building could be reinforced at a price that was 
acceptable to both Horman and DAC# and in a manner 
that would satisfy the building code requirements of 
the Salt Lake City Building Department. 
2. Horman was to commence construction only after 
confirmed receipt and acceptance by Horman of 
construction financing acceptable to Horman, and the 
entire lease was specifically subject to Horman being 
able to secure sufficient financing at a rate not to 
exceed 12% per annum and that DAC should pay all 
annual interest charges in excess of 12% per annum 
provided Horman did decide to pay a higher interest 
rate than 12%. 
3. DAC had use of office space in the old Kress 
Building only if it paid the nominal rent of $1.00 per 
month• 
4. Horman was obligated to construct the athletic 
clubs only if DAC sold a sufficient number of 
memberships prior to beginning construction of the 
athletic clubs in order to guarantee that the payments 
required by the Construction & Lease Agreement would 
be paid. 
5. DAC was to assign dues income of individual 
membership contracts/ by contract number, to a special 
account designated solely for the payment of monthly 
lease payments to verify that there were sufficient 
funds available. 
DAC contends that the parties orally modified the 
Construction & Lease Agreement by including an assignment of 
part of Horman*s leasehold interest in the Harver Warehouse 
Building to DAC. This oral agreement also contained conditions 
precedent most of which were identical to those enumerated in 
the Construction & Lease Agreement: 
1. The owners of the Harver Warehouse Building had to 
completely and absolutely release Horman from all 
obligations under the lease and accept DAC as the new 
lessee in place of Horman. 
2. Engineering studies had to be completed and 
approved by Salt Lake City for the renovation of the 
Harver Building. 
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3. Adequate financing for the completion of the « 
construction of the athletic club(s) had to be secured. 
Horman served notice on DAC to "quit the premises" after it 
sold some of the subject property to the Salt Lake Acquisition 
Group. Consequently, DAC filed suit against Horman on seeking 
specific performance and damages for breach of the written and 
oral agreements. Horman filed its answer and counterclaim for 
declaratory judgment, tortious waste, unlawful detainer, and 
slander of title on January 6, 1984. 
Comprehensive discovery ensued with each party producing 
hundreds of documents. Discovery ended with the depositions of 
the two principals. David Yurth, president of DAC, was deposed 
on April 2, 1984 resulting in a 283 page transcript, 36 
exhibits, and over 13 pages of corrections. S. M. Hormanfs 
deposition was taken April 26, 1984 resulting in a 245 page 
transcript and several exhibits. No further discovery was 
conducted by either party. 
Horman filed its motion for summary judgment together with 
supporting affidavits and a memorandum of points and 
authorities on July 19, 1984, nearly two months after the last 
deposition was taken and when there were no outstanding 
discovery requests. Oral argument on the motion was scheduled 
for August 28, 1984. On August 22, 1984, six days before the 
motion was to be argued, DAC's counsel moved to withdraw and 
requested a 60-day extension to respond to Hormanfs motion. 
The district court granted both of these requests. 
Sixty days elapsed without an appearance from DAC and 
without response to the motion. Consequently, on October 26, 
1984, Horman served written notice on DAC pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-51-36 (1978) requesting that it either appoint 
counsel or appear in person. On November 2, 1984, Horman 
renoticed its motion for summary judgment and scheduled the 
hearing for November 16, 1984. On November 13, 1984, DAC's new 
counsel entered an appearance and filed a motion for 
continuance, an ••extraordinary request for review," and noticed 
nine depositions all of which were scheduled after the 
scheduled oral argument on Horman*s summary judgment motion. 
On November 16, 1984, the district court heard oral 
argument on DACfs motion to continue and Horman#s motion for 
summary judgment. The district court denied DAC*s motion to 
continue, took Horman*s motion for summary judgment under 
advisement, and gave DAC an additional twenty days to file a 
written response to Hormanfs motion for summary judgment. On 
December 6, 1984, DAC filed a motion to compel discovery 
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seeking to -continue- S. M. Horman*s deposition.1 DAC's 
motion to compel was supported by an affidavit claiming the 
need for further discovery. After receiving several 
continuances, DAC filed its memorandum in opposition to 
Hormanfs motion for summary judgment on December 10, 1984 
together with eight affidavits, some of which were unsworn and 
unsigned. 
The district court denied DAC's motion to compel further 
deposing of S. M. Horman and granted Hormanfs motion for 
summary judgment holding that the oral agreement was void under 
the statute of frauds and that Horman was excused from 
performing under the Construction & Lease Agreement because 
none of the conditions precedent had been performed. This 
appeal followed. 
Three issues are raised on appeal. First, did the lower 
court abuse its discretion in denying DACfs motion to continue 
and its motion to compel further discovery? Second, is the 
oral modification of the Construction & Lease Agreement void 
under the statute of frauds and, if not, do the uncontested 
facts demonstrate that Horman was excused from performing under 
the terms of the modification? Third, did the lower court err 
in granting Horman's motion for summary judgment ruling that 
Horman was excused from performing under the Construction & 
Lease Agreement as DAC failed to satisfy the requisite 
conditions precedent? 
We will review the facts and inferences in the light most 
favorable to DAC, the party against whom the judgment was 
granted. Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank. 737 P.2d 225, 229 
(Utah 1987). 
I. 
The first issue we must address is whether the trial court 
erred in denying DAC the opportunity to conduct further 
discovery prior to the entry of summary judgment. Generally, 
summary judgment should not be granted if discovery is 
incomplete since information sought in discovery may create 
genuine issues of material fact sufficient to defeat the 
motion. Auerbach's Inc. v. Kimball. 572 P.2d 376, 377 (Utah 
1977). However, a court should deny a motion to continue if 
the motion opposing summary judgment is dilatory or without 
merit. See id. 
1. Hormanfs counsel refused to allow S. M. Horman, an 80 
year-old man who already had been subjected to extensive 
cross-examination during the initial deposition, to undergo yet 
further deposing until the trial court had ruled on its summary 
judgment motion. 
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Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that a party opposing summary judgment may submit an affidavit 
stating the reasons why he is presently unable to present 
evidentiary affidavits essential to support his opposition to 
summary judgment. If the court finds the reasons to be 
adequate, the court may, among other things, order that further 
discovery be conducted and continue the summary judgment 
motion. The Utah Supreme Court, in Cox v. Winters. 678 P.2d 
311, 313-14 (Utah 1984), delineated several factors to consider 
under Rule 56(f): 
1. Were the reasons articulated in the 
Rule 56(f) affidavit "adequate" or is the 
party against whom summary judgment is 
sought merely on a "fishing expedition" 
for purely speculative facts after 
substantial discovery has been conducted 
without producing any significant evidence? 
2. Was there sufficient time since the 
inception of the lawsuit for the party 
against whom summary judgment is sought to 
use discovery procedures, and thereby 
cross-examine the moving party? 
3. If discovery procedures were timely 
initiated, was the non-moving party 
afforded an appropriate response? 
Applying the foregoing legal principles, we find that the 
district court properly denied DACfs motion to compel further 
deposing of S. M. Horman and its motion to continue the summary 
judgment hearing. Both parties conducted extensive discovery. 
Hundreds of documents were produced. Lengthy depositions were 
taken. The record reveals that DAC failed to conduct further 
discovery although it had ample time and opportunity to do so. 
Discovery essentially ended on April 26, 1984. Three months 
elapsed before Horman filed its motion for summary judgment. 
During this three-month period DAC conducted no further 
discovery. DAC was given six weeks before oral argument on the 
motion for summary judgment in which to conduct any necessary 
discovery. Again, DAC sought no further discovery. DAC was 
also granted an additional 60-day extension specifically to 
respond to Horman•s motion when DAC's original counsel withdrew 
five days before oral argument was scheduled. These additional 
60 days lapsed without DAC entering an appearance or seeking 
any additional discovery. 
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On November 2, 1984# nearly four months after Horman,filed 
its initial motion for summary judgment# and with no action by 
DAC to respond to the motion, Horman again noticed its motion 
for summary judgment and scheduled oral argument for November 
16, 1984 providing DAC yet another two weeks to respond to its 
motion. Three days prior to the scheduled oral argument, DAC's 
new counsel appeared and finally sought additional discovery by 
noticing nine depositions (scheduled after oral argument on the 
motion for summary judgment). 
On December 6, 1984, DAC moved to compel the appearance of 
S. M. Horman to continue his deposition. DAC's motion to 
compel discovery was accompanied by an affidavit by its counsel 
claiming the need for further discovery.2 This affidavit, 
however, is deficient as a Rule 56(f) affidavit. It fails to 
articulate any material area of inquiry not covered by the 
original deposition of S. M. Horman. Rather, DAC's counsel 
merely states: 
Having read the Horman deposition there are a 
number of areas into which Mr. Zoll [DAC's 
original counsel] did not inquire and 
disposition of this case in a prompt and 
reasonable manner depends upon prompt access 
to the information and alleged testimony 
which will be given by Mr. Horman. 
There are a number of issues into which the 
Plaintiff's counsel Mr. Zoll did not inquire 
and notice was given at the end of the day 
that the deposition was being continued. 
We believe that DAC's counsel was simply on a ••fishing 
expedition" for purely speculative facts after substantial 
discovery had been conducted without producing any significant 
evidence. Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d at 312-313, 314. Moreover, 
DAC had sufficient time and opportunity before the summary 
judgment motion was argued to conduct discovery and in fact did 
so. 
We also are of the opinion that DAC had ample 
opportunity to cross-examine S. M. Horman during his initial 
deposition. The deposition took an entire day. At the initial 
2. DAC did not identify its affidavit as a Rule 56(f) 
affidavit. However, the substance of the affidavit suggests it 
was intended to be such. We are controlled by substance, not 
captions. Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Bastian, 657 P.2d 1346, 1348 
(Utah 1983). Therefore, we will treat DAC#s affidavit as a Rule 
56(f) affidavit. 
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deposition DACfs original counsel requested that S. M. Horman 
and his counsel be available for two full days. Schedules were 
rearranged to meet this request. The deposition was stopped, 
abruptly at 4:45 p.m. on the first day. Horman was prepared to 
proceed further that day and the next as scheduled by DAC's 
counsel. DAC's counsel, however, chose not to proceed. 
By way of summary, the record indicates that DAC had 
over a year to conduct discovery and had been given several 
continuances and extensions by the trial judge. DAC did not 
articulate any specific factual area which needed further 
probing. Under the totality of the circumstances, the trial 
court reasonably concluded that no further factual development 
was necessary and properly denied DAC's motion to compel and 
its compel to continue. 
II. 
Next, we must determine if the trial court correctly 
found that the alleged oral modification of the Construction & 
Lease Agreement did not preclude Hormancs motion for summary 
judgment. 
DAC contends that the parties orally modified the 
written contract, a contention which Horman disputes, by 
including an assignment by Horman of part of its leasehold 
interest in the Harver Warehouse Building to DAC. Both parties 
agree that Horman contemplated assigning its interest in the 
masterlease only if Horman was completely released by the 
owners of the Harver Warehouse Building from all obligations 
under the lease. The alleged oral modification also contained 
two other conditions precedent which were identical to those 
identified in the Construction & Lease Agreement. First, DAC 
was required to secure Hadequate" construction and long-term 
financing, and second, DAC was to provide acceptable 
engineering reports to Salt Lake City to obtain the appropriate 
building permit to reinforce and reconstruct the Harver 
Warehouse Building. 
DAC concedes that when the statute of frauds requires a 
contract to be in writing, Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (1984), any 
alteration or modification must also be in writing. Zion's 
Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319, 1322 (Utah 1975). 
DAC, however, argues that the oral modification of the 
Construction & Lease Agreement was removed from the bar of the 
statute of frauds under the doctrine of partial performance. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-8 (1984). 
DAC alleges that it partly performed the oral 
modification by attempting to secure the specified construction 
and long-term financing, by selling memberships to the clubs, 
and by retaining firms to perform the engineering studies. All 
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of the acts alleged, including the engineering studies an$ the 
financing, were not exclusively referable to the oral 
modification but were also required under the original 
Construction & Lease Agreement and thus would not remove the 
oral modification from the statute of frauds. See McDonald v. 
Barton Bros. Inv. Corp.. 631 P.2d 851, 853 (Utah 1981). More 
importantly, however, even if the oral modification was 
enforceable, DAC's position still fails. As more fully 
developed in section III of this opinion, the conditions 
precedent to the oral modification were not satisfied and thus 
Hormanfs obligation to perform under the oral modification 
never arose. 
III. 
The third issue on appeal is whether the trial court 
erred in concluding as a matter of law that none of the 
conditions precedent to the written contract were satisfied 
thus excusing Horman's obligation to perform. 
It is undisputed that all the conditions precedent to 
the Construction & Lease Agreement had to be satisfied before 
Horman became obligated to construct and ultimately lease the 
athletic clubs to DAC. If one condition was not satisfied, 
Horman was excused from performing.3 A review of the record 
discloses that DAC failed to satisfy several of the conditions 
precedent to the written agreement. 
As previously discussed, Horman was to make improvements 
provided that the Harver Warehouse Building could be reinforced 
at a price that was acceptable to both parties, and in a manner 
that would satisfy the requirements of the Salt Lake City 
Building Department. This provision really contains two 
conditions precedent involving engineering studies. 
Engineering studies had to be completed before the cost of 
reinforcement could be determined and before the Building 
Department could consider whether to issue the appropriate 
permit. 
The undisputed facts in the record indicate that 
although DAC attempted to have engineering studies performed on 
the Harver Warehouse Building, no final engineering study was 
3. The Construction & Lease Agreement did not contain an 
express "time is of the essence" provision. Therefore, DAC had 
a reasonable time under the circumstances in which to satisfy 
the conditions precedent. Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 
1240, 1242 (Utah 1980). The agreement was executed on May 8, 
1981. DAC filed its complaint on September 9, 1983. 
Therefore, DAC had over two years to satisfy the conditions. 
Neither party questioned whether this was a sufficient amount 
of time for DAC to perform. 
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in fact completed much less submitted to the City for 
approval. 
DAC originally retained Bonneville Engineering to 
conduct the engineering studies. DAC later retained Scott 
Evans# managing partner of Cornwall Evans & Fife# architects. 
Evans in turn hired Ronald Weber of Weber & Associates to 
conduct the requisite engineering studies and determine costs. 
Scott Evans, in a sworn affidavit, claims that he hired a 
structural engineer to "suggest appropriate engineering 
upgrades or structural reinforcements" as required by the 
City. Scott Evans/ however, merely states that the "results" 
of the engineering study and recommendations for structural 
reinforcement and preliminary drawings were presented to Roger 
Evans/ assistant director of the Department of Building & 
Housing Services for Salt Lake City Corporation. Scott Evans 
admits that Roger Evans, in a meeting, required final working 
drawings of the suggested engineering solutions. Conspicuously 
absent from Scott Evans' affidavit is his sworn statement that 
he did in fact submit the final engineering drawings and 
seismic analysis to the City and that they were approved. 
Roger Evans, the assistant director of the Department of 
Building & Housing Services for Salt Lake City Corporation, in 
his affidavit, states that DAC never submitted any plans, 
specifications, engineering reports or the requested seismic 
analysis to the Department. In light of Roger Evans* and Scott 
Evans' affidavits, it is uncontroverted that the requisite 
engineering studies were never submitted to the City. 
Consequently, the cost of reinforcement of the Harver Warehouse 
Building could not be determined and the City could not approve 
such reinforcement. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's 
conclusion that this condition precedent was not satisfied and 
Horman's obligation to perform under either the original 
Construction & Lease Agreement or the alleged oral modification 
was excused. 
Having found that this one condition precedent has not 
been performed, we decline to address whether DAC satisfied any 
other conditions because, as previously discussed, all the 
conditions precedent had to be satisfied before Horman's 
performance was required. 
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Affirmed. Costs to Horman. 
Judith M, Billings, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
R. W. Garff, Judge 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
pOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
"V-
S. M. HORMAN, and individual, 
a/k/a SID HORMAN; S. M. HORMAN, 
& SONS, a Partnership; and 
S. M. HORMAN & SONS COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
S. M. HORMAN & SONS COMPANY, 
Defendant and 
Counterplaintiff, 
i ^ v -
DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB, 
a Utah corporation, and 
DAVID G. YURTH, an individual, 
Counterdefendants. 
Civil No. C 83-6545 
(Judge David B. Dee) 
ORDER 
and 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
APPENDIX NO. 2 
-1-
The defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment came on regularly 
for hearing, pursuant to notice, on November 16, 1984. The 
plaintiff was represented at the hearing by Mr. Lorin N. Pace, Mr. 
William B. Parsons III, and Mr. G. Randall Klimt, of the firm of 
Pace, Klimt, Wunderly & Parsons. Mr. L. R. Gardiner, Jr., and Mr. 
David B. Thomas, of the firm of Fox, Edwards, Gardiner & Brown, 
represented the defendants. 
At the hearing, plaintifffs counsel presented to the Court a 
motion to extend time for hearing on the motion for summary 
judgment and also presented a motion for extraordinary review, 
requesting that the motion to extend time for hearing be heard 
even though proper notice had not been given as required by the 
rules. Although neither of said motions was in the file before 
the Court and proper notice had not been given, counsel foi 
defendants indicated that although these motions had only beer 
served upon him three and two days before the hearing 
respectively, he had no objection to their being heard. Th 
plaintiff's motion for extraordinary review was therefore grante 
and arguments were presented on plaintiff's motion to continu 
hearing on the motion for summary judgment. Noting that th 
plaintiff had had an extraordinarily long time for preparation fc 
this hearing, the motion for summary judgment having been fil€ 
and served on July 19, 1984, and a substantial extension of tir 
having previously been granted, and there being no adequa^  
showing as to why the matter should be further continued, t 
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court denied the motion to continue the hearing but, after hearing 
arguments of counsel on the motion for summary judgment, did grant 
the plaintiff an additional twenty days within which to file a 
written memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary 
judgment. 
The time for filing of a memorandum by the plaintiff would 
have expired on December 6, 1984, but an additional extension of 
time until December 10, 1984, was granted. Counsel for plaintiff 
did, however, file on December 6, 1984, a motion to compel the 
deposition of Mr. S. M. Horman andean affidavit of plaintiff's 
counsel in support of that motion. Defendants1 counsel filed on 
December 7, 1984, a responsive affidavit. 
The plaintiff filed its Memorandum in Opposition to Motion 
for Summary Judgment on December 10, 1984, together with eight 
affidavits, two of which are unsigned and unsworn. Defendants 
timely filed a reply memorandum on December 17, 1984, together 
with a motion seeking an order to strike certain of the 
affidavits. 
Plaintiff's motion for extraordinary review, which was 
granted at the November 16, 1984, hearing and plaintiff's motion 
to continue hearing on the motion for summary judgment, which was 
denied at the November 16, 1984, hearing are hereby confirmed. 
There remain three motions for disposition by this Order and 
Summary Judgment: 
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1. The plaintiff's "Motion to Compel Discovery" which seeks 
to take further deposition of defendant S. M. Horman; 
2. The defendants' "Motion to Strike Affidavits"? 
3. The defendants' "Motion for Summary Judgment." 
In rendering this order and judgment the following matters 
are particularly noted: 
The motion for summary judgment was filed and served by the 
defendants on July 19, 1984, and at that time a notice of hearing 
was also filed and served giving notice of hearing on August 28, 
1984, thereby giving 42 days notice of .hearing. A memorandum and 
seven supporting affidavits were filed and served simultaneously 
with the motion. Thereafter, approximately one week before the 
scheduled hearing, Mr. B. Ray Zoll, who was then counsel for the 
plaintiff in this case, presented to the Court an ex parte motion 
for permission to withdraw as counsel and for extension of time 
for the plaintiff to obtain other counsel and to respond to the 
motion for summary judgment. The court granted that motion and, 
by written order prepared by counsel for plaintiff, granted 
plaintiff sixty days within which to obtain other counsel and tc 
file a proper response to the motion for summary judgment. 
No appearance of counsel was made within the sixty-da} 
period, and no response was filed to the motion for summary 
judgment. On October 26, 1984, the defendants served a notice 
pursuant to Section 36, Chapter 51, Title 78, Utah Code Annotated, 
requiring the plaintiff to appear by counsel or in person. 
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notice of hearing was served on November 2, 1984, setting the 
motion for summary judgment to be heard on November 16, 1984. 
Prior to the appearance of Mr. Pace as counsel in this case, the 
court received from Mr. David Yurth a letter reciting, among other 
things, that he had contacted a number of law firms but had been 
unable to obtain representation. 
It is also noted that the deposition of plaintiff's 
president, Mr. Yurth, was taken in this case on April 2, 1984, and 
that plaintiff took the deposition of defendant S. M. Horman on 
April 26, 1984. Plaintiff's taking of the deposition of Mr, 
Horman on April 26, 1984, appears to have been the last activity 
of the plaintiff in this case prior to the hearing on the motion 
for summary judgment and the entrance of the appearance of Mr. 
Pace three days before that hearing. 
The Court has necessarily taken more time than would be 
suggested by the mandate of Rule 56 that summary judgment, where 
appropriate, be granted "forthwith," because of the desire to give 
plaintiff ample opportunity to properly respond to the motion and 
because of the necessity to review the extensive memorandums and 
affidavits filed. Having now considered arguments of counsel, the 
affidavits, memoranda, and other pleadings, and having previously 
rendered a memorandum decision, this Order and Summary Judgment is 
now entered to formalize the rulings. 
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In ruling upon the plaintiff's motion to compel discovery, it 
is noted that the deposition of Mr. Horman was taken in this case 
by previous counsel for plaintiff on April 26, 1984. Plaintiff, 
during the entire time that the motion for summary judgment was 
pending, made no further effort to take further deposition of Mr. 
Horman or to undertake any further discovery until the filing of 
various notices of taking depositions three days before the 
hearing on the motion for summary judgment on November 16, 1984. 
The affidavit filed by plaintiff's counsel does not state any 
specific area of inquiry that is essential to a ruling on the 
motion for summary judgment or that is otherwise relevant to this 
action and which was not inquired into in the prior deposition. 
There is, therefore, no adequate showing that the Court's prior 
order denying plaintiff's motion for continuance should be 
altered, and there is no adequate showing that there is any 
information material to a disposition of the motion for summary 
judgment that has not previously been covered in the extensive 
deposition heretofore taken of Mr. Horman. The Court, having 
I 
considered said motion and affidavits, hereby denies the motion to 
compel further deposition of Mr. Horman upon the ground that the 
motion is contrary to the previous order of the court denying 
continuance of the hearing on the motion for summary judgment and 
upon the ground that nothing in the motion or affidavit in support 
thereof shows any adequate grounds or basis for the granting of 
said motion. 
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In ruling upon the defendants' motion to strike certain of 
the affidavits filed by plaintiff, it is noted that the documents 
headed "Affidavit of Maurice Green" and "Affidavit of Grant 
Squires" are unsigned and unsworn, that the "Affidavit of David 
Yurth as to the affidavits of Grant Squires, Maurice Green and 
Todd Marx" is an improper affidavit seeking to introduce thereby 
the testimony contained in otherwise unsigned affidavits, and that 
the other affidavit of David Yurth contains conclusions of law, 
hearsay evidence, and other statements which would not be 
admissible in evidence. Even without defendants' motion strike, 
said affidavits are not in accordance with the requirements of 
Rule 56(e) and therefore could not in any event be considered in 
ruling upon the motion for summary judgment. The Court, having 
considered the motion to strike and the affidavits to which it is 
directed, hereby grants the motion to strike, and the purported 
affidavits of Grant Squires and Maurice Green, the affidavit of 
David Yurth pertaining to the Squires and Green affidavits, and 
the portions of the affidavit of David Yurth to which the motion 
is directed are hereby stricken. 
Rule 56 requires that when a motion for summary judgment is 
made and supported, as provided in the rule, which is the case 
here, the response must set forth specific facts showing thai 
there is a "genuine" issue for trial. Rule 56 requires judgmeni 
if there is no "genuine" issue as to "material" facts. The motioi 
for summary judment has been amply supported, as provided in th< 
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rule, and shows that there can be no genuine issue that plaintiff 
has failed to comply with several conditions precedent in the 
agreements upon which plaintiff's complaint is based, and that the 
alleged oral agreement or modification fails to meet the 
requirements of the Statute of Frauds. The plaintiff's response 
has not shown that there is a genuine issue as to any material 
fact, and the motion for summary judgment must therefore be 
granted. There is no just reason for delay in entry of this 
judgment, and summary judgment in favor of defendants on 
plaintiff's complaint should be entered'at this time. 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that the plaintiff's motion to take additional deposition of 
defendant Horman is denied; the defendant's motion to strike the 
affidavits of Maurice Green, Grant Squires, the affidavit of David 
Yurth pertaining to those affidavits, and the portions of the 
second Yurth affidavit specified in said motion is granted, and 
said affidavits and portions of the Yurth affidavit are hereby 
stricken; and summary judgment is hereby granted in favor of the 
defendants and against the plaintiff on the complaint in this 
action, and the complaint herein is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice and plaintiff shall take nothing thereby, and this 
judgment shall now be entered. 
DATED this fl? day o f - ^ K y ^ 1985. 
D i s t r i c t J;*ag,e 
-i*- l A ^ y ftr Ufs&Mhu I - „ A _ 8 _ ~=rfWi 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE! 
This is to certify that the foregoing Order and Summary 
Judgment was served upon the plaintiff and counterdefendants 
herein by mailing a true and correct copy thereof to Lorin 
N. Pace, of the firm of Pace, Klimt, Wunderly & Parsons, 1200 
University Club Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 
day of January, 1985. Zj/ 
RULE 56 Utah Roles of Civil Procedure UTAH CODE HTMM8 
No judgment by default shall be entered against 
the State of Utah or against an officer or agency 
thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or 
right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court. 
RULE 56. SlJMMARY JUDGMENT 
(•) For Claimant. 
(b) For Defeadiag Party. 
(c) Motion Bad Proceedings Taereoa. 
(d) Case Not Fally Adjudicated oa Motto*. 
(c) Form of Affidavits; Farther Teanaoay; Defease 
Required. 
(f) Waea Affidavits are Unavailable. 
(g) Affidavits Made ia Bad Faith. 
(a) For Claimant. 
A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counte-
rclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory 
judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 
twenty days from the commencement of the action 
or after service of a motion for summary judgment 
by the adverse party, move with or without suppo-
rting affidaviu for a summary judgment in his favor 
upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For Defending Party. 
A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is 
sought, may, at any time, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. 
The motion shall be served at least ten days 
before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse 
party prior to the day of hearing may serve oppo-
sing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rend-
ered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability 
alone although there is a genuine issue as to the 
amount of damages. 
(d) Case Not Fally Adjudicated on Motion. 
If on motion under this Rule judgment is not 
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief 
asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the 
hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings 
and the evidence before it and by interrogating 
counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material 
facts exist without substantial controversy and what 
material facts are actually and in good faith contr-
overted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying 
the facts that appear without substantial controv-
ersy, including the extent to which the amount of 
damages or other relief is not in controversy, and 
directing such further proceedings in the action as 
are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so 
specified shall be deemed established, and the trial 
shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defease 
Required. 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made 
on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify 
to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified 
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in 
an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served the-
rewith. The court may permit affidaviu to be sup-
plemented or opposed by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a 
motion for summary judgment is made and suppo-
rted as provided in this Rule, an adverse party may 
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as oth-
erwise provided in this Rule, must set forth specific 
facts snowing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 
If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When Affidavits are Unavailable. 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons 
stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify 
his opposition, the court may refuse the application 
for judgment or may order a continuance to permit 
affidaviu to be obtained or depositions to be taken 
or discovery to be had or may make such other 
order as is just. 
(g) Affidaviu Made In Bad Faith. 
Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at 
any time that any of the affidaviu presented purs-
uant to this Rule are presented in bad faith or solely 
for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith 
order the party employing them to pay to the other 
party the amount of the reasonable expenses which 
the filing of the affidaviu caused him to incur, 
including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offe-
nding party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of 
contempt. 
RULE 57. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 
The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judg-
ment pursuant to chapter 33 of Title 78, U.C.A. 
1953, shall be in accordance with these Rules, and 
the right to trial by jury may be demanded under 
the circumstances and in the manner provided in 
Rules 38 and 39. The existence of another adequate 
remedy does not preclude a judgment for declara-
tory relief in cases where it is appropriate. The court 
may order a speedy hearing of an action for a dec-
laratory judgment and may advance it on the cale-
ndar. 
RULE 58A. ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
(a) Jadgmeat Upoa the Verdict of a Jary. 
(b) Jadgmeat ia Otaer Cases. 
(c) Waea Jadgmeat Eatered; Notation fat 
Actio** aad Jadgmeat Docket. 
(d) Notice of Sigaing or Eatrv of Jadgateat. 
(e) Jadgaeai After Death of a Party. 
(f) Jadgmeat ay Coafoadoa. 
(a) Judgment Upon the Verdict of a Jary. 
Unless the court otherwise directs and subject to 
the provisions of Rule 54(b), judgment upon the 
verdict of a jury shall be forthwith signed by the 
clerk and filed. If there is' a special verdict or a 
general verdict accompanied by answers to interro-
gatories returned by a jury pursuant to Rule 49, the 
court shall direct the appropriate judgment which 
shall be forthwith signed by the clerk andTiled. 
(b) Judgment In Other Cases. 
Except as provided in subdivision (a) hereof and 
subdivision (b) (1) of Rule 55, all judgments shall be 
signed by the judge and filed with the clerk. 
(c) When Judgment Entered; Notation in Register of 
Actions and Judgment Docket. 
A judgment is complete and shall be deemed 
entered for all purposes, except the creation of a 
lien on real property, when the same is signed and 
448 For Annotations, consult CODEOCO'S Annotation Service COOE.C6 
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